Virtue in Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas

My Virtue Ethics Essay

1. Introduction

Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas each offer unique insights into virtue ethics. While Plato emphasizes the soul’s union with the Good and Aristotle focuses on cultivating rational virtues to achieve happiness, Aquinas transcends both by proposing the category of “theological virtue.” This paper summarizes each philosopher’s view of virtue and concludes with an analysis of the distinctive features of Aquinas’ ethical system.

2. Plato and Aristotle on Virtue

Plato’s ethics are rooted in his view of the eternal soul and the transiency of the material world. In Plato’s ontology, material things are imperfect reflections of their eternal forms and everything—physical things and forms—comes from the Good. Despite humans having physical bodies, we possess rational souls with the power to contemplate the forms and, ultimately, the Good itself. Plato strongly emphasizes that virtuous conduct is essentially connected to the acquisition of wisdom, as wisdom consists of contemplating the Good, which is, by consequence, the good and telos of man. Since the forms are immaterial, only the immaterial soul can perceive them and attain wisdom. Philosophy is how one attains wisdom and is, therefore, the ultimate example of virtuous conduct. However, when one becomes excessively occupied with material realities, the soul is prevented from attaining its true end:” [A]re you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and honours as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth or the best possible state of your soul?”¹ Plato presents Socrates as an example of a virtuous person dedicated to pursuing wisdom, even at the cost of his earthly life.

Like Plato, Aristotle sees human life as fulfilled only in its true end, which he considers happiness. In Aristotle’s ontology, all of reality is teleologically ordered, with every nature possessing its own unique end. He locates rational activity as the unique end of humanity, and so, virtue consists of rational activity which leads to man’s happiness. Aristotle distinguishes between two categories of virtue: moral and intellectual virtue. In the case of moral virtue, man exercises his rationality when he determines the “mean” between deficiency and excess: “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle…”² In the case of courage, for example, the mean lies between cowardice and rashness and can only be achieved when one’s irrational instincts—such as fear and impulsivity—are subject to one’s reason. On the other hand, intellectual virtues (of which there are five) are not based on practical moderation but on the continual attainment of knowledge. For instance, artistic skill (techne) consists of the ability to make and design and greater mastery only enhances one’s virtue. Similarly, wisdom—the highest form of knowledge—becomes greater as one contemplates eternal truths; one cannot be “too wise.” Thus, Aristotle considers virtue and the fulfillment of human happiness to consist of cultivating moderation and continually acquiring knowledge.

3. Comparing Aquinas with Plato and Aristotle

In many ways, St. Thomas Aquinas’ ethics are a development of Aristotle’s, the latter being heavily influenced by Platonic philosophy. Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s teleological view of action, along with the general structure of his ethical system and the various categories he proposes. Like Plato and Aristotle, Aquinas sees the universe as teleologically ordered towards the Good, which he identifies as the Christian God: “In created things good is found not only as regards their substance, but also as regards their order towards an end, and especially their last end, which, as was said above, is the divine goodness.”³ Man is a composite nature—body and soul—with an intellect capable of grasping truth and, ultimately, knowing God Himself. Aquinas adopts Aristotle’s insight that rational activity is the unique property of man and, therefore, the telos of human nature. He also agrees with Aristotle’s definition of virtue as acting in accordance with one’s nature since to act in accordance with one’s nature is to fulfill one’s telos. However, for Aquinas, the ultimate telos of the human intellect is the vision of the Divine Essence itself.

Part of Aquinas’ genius consisted of his ability to be influenced by the ideas of pagans and other non-Christians without compromising the Christian faith. For example, Aquinas agrees with Plato in the existence of the immaterial soul and the inseparability of wisdom and virtue. However, since Aquinas believes the material world—including our bodies—is created by God as intrinsically good, he disagrees with Plato’s separation of the body from the meaning of human nature and his characterization of matter as inherently imperfect. While Aquinas affirms that the soul can be “happy” without the body,⁴ the final state of blessedness the saints attain includes the glorification of their bodies in the Final Resurrection.⁵

Crucially, both the beatific vision and the Final Resurrection are not states attainable by human power alone, but the grace of God. This point highlights the central distinction between Aristotle and Aquinas, along with the addition the latter makes to the former’s ethical system: Aquinas believes in grace and supernature. While Aristotle distinguishes between moral and intellectual virtue, Aquinas adds a third category: theological virtue (consisting of faith, hope, and charity). For Aquinas, all the virtues are fulfilled in charity, as charity is “the mother and root of all virtues” and brings us into union with God.⁶ Theological virtues are unique insofar as they can only be actualized through the operation or grace of God working with us, and are not at all a power of human nature: “[A]nd because such happiness surpasses the capacity of human nature, [...] it is necessary for man to receive from God some additional principles, whereby he may be directed to supernatural happiness…”⁷ Despite theological virtue—through which we attain the beatific vision—being beyond the powers of human nature, it is nonetheless the very telos of humanity. Thus, almost paradoxically, the fulfillment of human nature is participation in supernatural bliss. For Aristotle, however, the good of every nature is the realization of its immanent entelechy, the actualization of the intrinsic potentials of its nature. He has no notion of supernatural power that freely creates, sustains, and graciously redeems human nature in a manner transcending our own powers. The Christian God does not merely operate upon existing potential like Aristotle’s efficient cause: the redemption He offers is utterly gratuitous (just as He creates ex nihilo) and entirely beyond our natural powers. And yet, participation in supernatural grace is the natural end of man and, hence, the very essence of virtue.

4. Conclusion

Ultimately, while Plato and Aristotle provide foundational insights for virtue ethics, Aquinas advances these ideas by grounding virtue in divine grace. Plato’s low view of matter separates him from the Christian faith, and both him and Aristotle stop short of affirming the supernatural telos of humanity and the necessity of grace. Aquinas develops both their philosophies by synthesizing them with revelation. This synthesis not only preserves the insights of classical philosophy but also reveals the unique depths of Christian virtue ethics.

1. Plato, Apology, trans. G.M.A. Grube, in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle, ed. S. Marc Cohen et al., 2nd ed, Hackett Publishing Company, 2000, 120.

2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, rev. Lesley Brown, Oxford World's Classics, Oxford University Press, 2009, 31.

3. Kreeft, Peter. Summa of the Summa, Ignatius Press, 2011, 171.

4. Ibid, 384.

5. Ibid, 388.

6. Ibid, 467.

7. Ibid, 467.