There are three general perspectives from which one can view the world: fallen (sinful), protological (temporal) and eschatological (eternal). The fallen perspective misunderstands the world, the protological perspective accurately apprehends the world in its current state, and the eschatological perspective contemplates the end/telos of the world (its full union with God in the eschaton). I suggest that all contradictions result from applying protological or eschatological standards to fallen realities (sin) or vice-versa and that all antinomies result from applying eschatological standards to protological realities or vice-versa.
Contradictions and antinomies are not the same. A contradictory statement involves one part negating/undermining another, thereby rendering the statement meaningless. For example, in the contradictory judgment “the rock is a tree,” the “rock” is negated when identified with the tree (and vice-versa), so the statement actually says nothing about rocks or trees at all. As said above, my theory is that “contradictions” arise when protological or eschatological standards are applied to fallen realities or vice-versa. For example, it is an eschatological fact that creation only exists in communion with God. But if we try to understand the nature of sin as something truly “existing,” we will fall into misunderstandings (as sin as such is the withdrawal from communion with God). One cannot apply eschatological standards to sin, or we end in a contradiction (e.g. “sinning is communing with God”). While eschatological standards (as revealed in Christ) are key reference points from which we can understand the nature of both protological reality and sin (e.g. since true being is communion with God, sin/evil must be purely negative/privative), in themselves these standards cannot be applied to fallen realities, as the essence of the fall (withdrawal from God) is the precise opposite of the essence of the eschaton (communion with God).
The fallen mind tends towards non-communal understandings of reality. Since fallen rationality claims the abstract law of identity (A=A) as its first principle, it always fails to see that identity is not abstract but living. In other words, yes, A=A, but only because “B” or “the other” is constitutive of the identity of A (A=A entails that A=/=B; thus, B is immanent to the very identity of A). A is always “entering into” B and vice-versa, or in more concrete terms, we only ever exist as distinct selves insofar as we are actively related to the world and, ultimately, God.1 One cannot abstract the “self” from its relations, as the self is essentially bound up with them. The self always-already exists in relation, not because the self “is” relation, but because the self is always oriented towards a reality beyond it (as discussed in this post). The most basic limitation of fallen rationality is that it considers itself complete/self-sufficient and falls under the illusion that it alone can explain itself, the world, and even God! But since rationality (and everything in creation) is a gift from God and not a self-sufficient reality, attempting to explain it or anything in the world without reference to God will, ultimately, fail. It is an attempt to apply fallen (non-communal) standards to protological realities and, therefore, results in a contradiction (“created being is self-sufficient”). But can a contradiction as basic/mundane as “a rock is a tree” be understood as an application of fallen standards to protological/eschatological realities?
We’ve defined fallen as “non-communal,” so how specifically does the contradiction “a rock is a tree” rely on non-communal understandings? The answer to this question can only be found if we keep in mind that “union” is always union-in-distinction (this is communion). In Trinitarian theology, the “unity” of God is realized in the consubstantiality (one nature) and perichoresis (mutual interiority) of the three distinct divine persons. God creates the world as a symbol of His own divine life, and therefore it should be no surprise that in order for there to be unity in creation, there must be distinct persons/things to be united together. But the necessity of distinction is not something we need to prove empirically: union, by its very definition, necessitates at least two distinct things that are united (it is a logical necessity because “logic” is intrinsic to the divine mind, which subsists as the Tri-unity). Thus, the reason why “a rock is a tree” is a non-communal contradiction is because it fails to grasp the necessity of distinction, of the irreducibility of each hypostasis to the other. The judgment in question therefore applies a fallen (mis)understanding (specifically the negation of distinction) to protological realities (rocks and trees).
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